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tional issue presented should have been
considered. He indicated that, had the
issue been considered, he would have
held that section 554 does not infringe
upon the constitutional right of privacy.
Id. at 737, 580 A.2d at 187.
In Scbochet v. State, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland considerably narrowed the scope of section 554 by
excluding from its application consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activities between adults in private. Although, as the court points out in its
opinion, section 554 is still viable as applied to activities not expressly excluded
by its opinion, the scope and constitutionality of its application to such activities remains in question. By artfully
avoiding the constitutional issue presented in this case, the court avoided the
possibility of being reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court. However,
this has merely postponed a seemingly
inevitable ruling which will define the
extent of the State's control over the
most intimate and personal aspects of
the lives of its citizenry.
- Mark K. Boyer

Cooter & Gell fl. Hartmarx Corporation: VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT WILL
NOT PROTECT PLAINTIFF
FROM IMPOSITION OF RULE 11
SANCTIONS
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,
no S. Ct. 2447 (1990), the Supreme
Court resolved a split among the federal
circuit courts in their application of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The
Court held that a plaintiffs voluntary
dismissal did not destroy the jurisdiction of the federal district court to
award Rule 11 sanctions. Additionally,
the Court held that the appropriate
standard of review on appeal was an
abuse of discretion standard. However,
the Court ruled that expenses incurred
in an appeal of sanctions were not
includable in the amount of the monetary award.
Hartmarx Corporation ("Hartmarx")
filed a breach of contract action against
Danik Incorporated ("Danik"), who,
represented by the law firm of Cooter &
Gell, filed a counterclaim to that action.
The district court found in favor of
Hartmarx in both matters. Thereafter,
Danik filed two antitrust complaints

against Hartmarx, one of which was the
subject of the appeal.
The complaint in question alleged,
inter alia, the existence of a nationwide
conspiracy to fix prices and to eliminate
competition. Hartmarx moved to dismiss the complaint and for sanctions
under Rule 11 based principally on the
grounds that the suit had no basis in fact.
Danik filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the antitrust complaint which
became effective in June 1984. Thereafter, the court entertained argument on
the Rule 11 motion.
In December 1987, the district court
granted the Rule 11 motion for sanctions and awarded costs and fees for
defense of the action against Danik and
Cooter & Gell. The court of appeals
affirmed, but additionally ruled that the
matter be remanded to the district court
where the expenses incurred as a result
of the appeal should be assessed against
Danik and Cooter & Gell. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
The Court considered three issues on
appeal. First, whether a district court
may impose Rule 11 sanctions on a
plaintiff who voluntarily dismissed a
complaint. Second, what was the appropriate standard of review in the
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Third,
whether awarding attorney fees incurred
on appeal of the sanctions was authorized under Rule 11.
The Court first addressed Danik's contention that its voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 (a)( 1) automatically
deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the Rule 11 motion, and thus,
the sanctions and award of attorney fees
and costs were improper.ld. at 2454-55.
In its analysis, the Court considered
both the language of and the purposes
behind the promulgation of Rule 11 and
Rule 4I(a)(I).
Rule 11 requires that an attorney or
party offering a paper to a court must
sign that paper. By signing, the attorney
or party certifies that:
the signer has read the ... paper;
that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not inter-

posed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation.
[Fed. R Civ. P. 11.]
If signed in violation of the rule, the
court "shall" impose upon the attorney
or his client "an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to
the other party or parties the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred because ofthe filing" of the paper. [d. The
Court determined that the purpose of
Rule 11 is to deter baseless lawsuits and
to streamline the judicial process. Cooter
& Gell, 110 S.Ct. at 2454.
In contrast, the purpose of Rule 41 (a)
( 1 ) is to limit a plaintiff's ability to dismiss an action without prejudice. Specifically, the provision allows a plaintiff
"one free dismissal" without the permission of the adverse party or the
court, provided certain procedural requirements are followed.ld. at 2456-57.
However, the Court stated, Rule 41
(a)( 1) did not secure the plaintiffs
right to file baseless papers.ld. at 2457.
The Court reasoned that if a litigant
could purge his Rule 11 violation merely
by taking a dismissal, he would lose all
incentive to investigate more carefully
before serving and filing papers. [d.
The Court rejected the petitioner's
argument and found that the language
and policies behind Rule 11 were consistent with the district court's pOSition
that it had authority to rule on the
motion after the dismissal of the action.
[d. The Court found that the jurisdiction
of the district court was invoked when
the underlying complaint was filed and
was not destroyed by the voluntary dismissal. The Court further found that the
Rule 11 motion was a collateral issue,
not a judgment on the merits, and therefore, the imposition of sanctions did not
deprive the plaintiff of his Rule 41 (a)( 1)
right to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice. Thus, the Court held the award of
attorney fees and costs was properly
made after the voluntary dismissal of the
suit. [d.
Similarly, the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the court of
appeals erred in applying an abuse of
'disci'etion standard in reviewing the
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. In its
analysis, the Court compared the language in the Equal Access to Justice Act
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("EAJA") to the language of Rule 11
which it considered analogous.
Under the EAJA, the federal government must be "substantially justified"
for its action or inaction. If litigants are
forced to challenge the federal government's activities in court, attorney fees
may be awarded against the government
unless its activities were "substantially
justified." A district court's decision on
that issue is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Id. at 2459-60 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 US. 552,
559-60 (1988».
The Court reasoned that determining
whether an action was "substantially
justified" under the EAJA was analogous
to determining whether an attorney's
complaint was factually well-grounded
and legally tenable for Rule 11 purposes.
Both situations require fact-specific findings which, according to the Court, the
district courts are in a better position to
make. Furthermore, district courts are
"best acquainted with the local bar's litigation practices and thus best situated
to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 11 's goal of specific
and general deterrence." Id. at 2460.
Since an abuse of discretion standard
had been applied to district court findings under the EAJA, the Court held that
the same standard of review was appropriate for district court findings under
Rule 11. Id. at 2460-61.
Finally, the Court considered the petitioner's contention that the court of
appeals erroneously found that Rule 11
sanctions may include attorney fees incurred as a result of an appeal of the
sanction. The Court interpreted the language of Rule 11 and the drafter's comments as limited to those costs directly
incurred as a result of the filing of the
frivolous suit. The Court reasoned that
o
.
the attorney fees on appeal dld not stem
from the filing of the complaint, but
rather from the imposition of the sanctions by the district court. Id. at 2461. In
that Rule 38 provides attorney fees and
damages for wrongful appeal, the Court
reasoned, the scope of Rule 11 is naturally limited to fees connected with the
filing of the complaint. Id. at 2462. Following the American rule that the prevailing litigant would not ordinarily be
entitled to attorney fees, the Court reversed on this issue. Id.
In Cooter & Gell, the decision of the

Court clarifies the manner in which
Rule 11 should be applied by district
courts. Now, even if a plaintiffvoluntarily dismisses a suit, the district court may
impose sanctions for violation of Rule
lIon both the plaintiff and the plaintift's
attorney, subject only to review for
abuse of discretion.
- Laura Campbell
NOW v. Operation Rescue: INJUNC.
TION PROHIBITING BLOCKING
ACCESS TO ABORTION F ACILI·
TIES IN VIOLATION OF CIVIL
RIGHTS CONSPIRACY STATUTE
UPHELD
In NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that pro-life demonstrators
could be enjoined from blocking entry
to an abortion clinic on the ground that
it denied women their constitutional
right to interstate travel in violation of
the civil rights conspiracy statute. The
court affirmed the district court injunction on the ground that there was no
abuse of discretion.
The plaintiffs/appellees (hereinafter
"NOW') were nine clinics that provided abortion-related services and five
organizations devoted to preserving
women's rights to obtain abortions. Defendants/appellants (hereinafter "Operation Rescue") were Operation Rescue, a pro-life organization, and six
individuals who opposed abortion and
sought to have the procedure made
illegal.
NOW filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. They sought to enjoin Opera. tion Rescue from blocking entry to and
exit from facilities that offered abortion
and abortion-related services. The motion was filed, and granted, in anticipation of rescue demonstrations which
were scheduled to take place in the
immediate future in the Washington
metropolitan area. Although the court
enjoined the defendants from "trespassing on, blockading, impeding or
obstructing access to or egress from the
[listed 1premises," it declined to extend
the injunction to the activities that
tended to "intimidate, harass or disturb
patients or potential patients." Id. at
584.

The district court concluded that the
defendants' activities violated the provisions of 42 US.c. § 1985(3) (1988) by
depriving women seeking abortions and
abortion-related services of their constitutional right to travel interstate in
search of medical facilities. Id. To bring
a successful action under § 1985( 3), the
court noted, a plaintiff must prove a
conspiracy to deprive any person, or
class of persons, of the equal protection
of the laws, or of the equal privileges and
immunities under the law. In addition,
the plaintiff must prove that the conspirators committed acts in furtherance of
their goals, thus causing injury to persons or property, and depriving any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United
States. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914
F.2d at 584 (citing 42 US.C. §1985
(3». The district court reasoned that
rescue demonstrations were acts in furtherance of a conspiracy which interfered with the right to travel in that
many women in the Washington metropolitan area traveled interstate to obtain
abortions and abortion related services.
Id. at 585.
Finally, the district court concluded
that injunctive relief was appropriate
because: "(i) there was no adequate
remedy at law; (li) the balance of equities favored the plaintiffs; and (iii) the
public interest was served by granting
the injunction." Id.
The defendants appealed the order,
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to grant relief against three of
their members. Id. at 586. NOW crossappealed on the ground that the scope
of the injunction was too narrow, contending that the district court abused its
discretion in limiting the injunction to
Northern Virginia and for refusing to
grant the requested relief on a permanent basis. Id. The arguments of both
parties were duly noted, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the ruling of the lower
court.
Citing the ruling of the district court,
the fourth circuit court agreed that the
defendants' conduct crossed the line
from persuasion to coercion, denying
women the exercise oflegallyprotected
rights. Id. at 585. Further, the court
noted that the district court holding was
consistent with at least six other circuit
courts of appeals which have similarly
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